The Cat Is On the Mat. Or Is It a Dog? Dynamic Competition in Perceptual Decision Making by Quinton, Jean Charles et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Citation for the published version:  
 
Quinton, J. C., Catenacci Volpi, N., Barca, L., & Pezzulo, G. (2014). The Cat Is On 
the Mat. Or Is It a Dog? Dynamic Competition in Perceptual Decision Making. IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, 
44(5), 539-551. DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.2013.2279664 
 
Document Version:  Accepted Version  
 
 
Link to the final published version available at the publisher: 
 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.2013.2279664 
 
© 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must 
be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including 
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating 
new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any 
copyrighted ncomponent of this work in other works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General rights 
Copyright© and Moral Rights for the publications made accessible on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied and it is a 
condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements 
associated with these rights. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any 
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url 
(http://uhra.herts.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or 
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, any such 
items will be temporarily removed from the repository pending investigation. 
Enquiries 
Please contact University of Hertfordshire Research & Scholarly Communications for any enquiries at 
rsc@herts.ac.uk 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS: PART A 1
The cat is on the mat. Or is it a dog?
Dynamic competition in perceptual decision making
Jean Charles Quinton, Nicola Catenacci Volpi, Laura Barca, and Giovanni Pezzulo
Abstract—Recent neurobiological findings suggest that the
brain solves perceptual decision-making tasks by means of a
dynamic competition in which evidence is accumulated in favor
of the alternatives. However, it is unclear if and how the same
process applies in more complex, real-world tasks such as the
categorization of ambiguous visual scenes and what elements
are considered as evidence in this case. Furthermore, dynamic
decision models typically consider evidence accumulation as
a passive process disregarding the role of active perception
strategies. In this article, we adopt the principles of dynamic
competition and active vision for the realization of a biologically-
motivated computational model, which we test in a visual
categorization task. Furthermore, our system uses predictive
power of the features as the main dimension for both evidence
accumulation and the guidance of active vision. Comparison of
human and synthetic data in a common experimental set-up
suggests that the proposed model captures essential aspects of
how the brain solves perceptual ambiguities in time. Our results
point to the importance of the proposed principles of dynamic
competition, parallel specification and selection of multiple alter-
natives, prediction, and active guidance of perceptual strategies
for perceptual decision-making and the solution of perceptual
ambiguities, and suggest that they could apply to both the simple
perceptual decision problems studied in neuroscience and the
more complex ones addressed by vision research.
Index Terms—Perceptual decision-making, dynamic models,
prediction, active vision.
I. INTRODUCTION
ACCORDING to an authoritative view in neuroscience,perceptual decision-making is a dynamic process in
which alternatives (e.g., are these dots moving towards left
or right?) compete over time [1], [2]. Perceptual ambiguities
are solved by accumulating sensory evidence in favor of the
hypotheses, up to a threshold. Initial decisions can be revised,
too, when evidence is initially stronger for one hypothesis,
and successively for another. This process is well captured by
dynamic models of choice, such as drift-diffusion [3], neural
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races [4], dynamic accumulators [5], and dynamic stochastic
models [6], all essentially implementing statistical tests [7].
Dynamic models of choice have a good degree of correspon-
dence with neural data. Indeed, numerous experiments have
revealed that the activation of neurons in sensorimotor areas
(e.g., the macaque LIP, lateral intraparietal cortex) “ramps” up
in a way that is consistent with drift-diffusion models, and is
highly predictive of overt response (e.g., overt eye movements
to the left or right). This body of evidence has lead to the
proposal of a so-called intentional framework of perceptual
decision-making [8], in which evidence accumulation is inti-
mately related to action selection. Neuroimaging experiments
in humans show that the same mechanisms might be in play
besides simple perceptual decisions, such as for instance in
the recognition of faces and buildings, and could support
quite arbitrary mappings between stimuli and actions [9].
Recent studies indicate that a similar “ramping” mechanism
could regulate more abstract decisions that are not tied to any
effector-specific response [10]. Besides perceptual decisions,
dynamic competition has been proposed as a key principle for
the parallel specification and selection of multiple responses
[11] and categorization [12], [13]. In brief, this corpus of
evidence suggests the brain solves choice problems (of many
or possibly all kinds) using dynamic competition between two
or more hypotheses (or responses) maintained and updated in
parallel.
Although the proposals reviewed so far tend to emphasize
bottom-up sensory processes, a complementary view that is
gaining prominence is that perceptual processing is inherently
proactive and anticipatory [14], [15]. In a similar vein, it
has been proposed that to solve perceptual uncertainties the
brain adopts a generative approach to perceptual processing.
In this predictive coding view, the brain builds a hierarchical,
statistical model of the sensorium, and uses it to guide percep-
tual processing. Higher (cortical) layers represent increasingly
more abstract object features (or even semantic information),
and bias lower layers in a top-down manner by propagating
expectations, which play the role of (Bayesian) priors. In
turn, lower layers, which encode more fine-grained details of
perceptual stimuli, provide bottom-up feedback in the form
of prediction errors, which guide revisions of the perceptual
hypotheses [16], [17], [18]. In this framework, choice is
operated by minimizing prediction errors (generated by the
competing hypotheses) rather than accumulating evidence in
in favor of the alternatives.
Hierarchical and generative approaches to visual process-
ing are becoming popular in vision research, too (although
discriminative methods are still widespread). In the last few
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years, considerable progresses have been made towards the
realization of robust and scalable, so-called “deep learning”
architectures [19], [20]. Despite so, generative methods are
generally considered hard to implement and to scale up to
realistic situations. Possible solutions to this problem consist
in extracting and using (hierarchies of) features, which permit
recognizing equivalent object parts despite their different ap-
pearance [21], [22], combining generative and discriminative
approaches, or incorporating human knowledge in the decision
process.
A limitation of all these approaches is that they incorporate
a passive model of information collection. On the contrary,
the active perception view emphasizes that living organisms
gather information is an active way by exerting control over
their sensors and effectors [23]. As they are able to (partially)
determine their next stimuli, they can use an active strategy
to select what visual stimuli to attend and how to probe the
visual scene. In this perspective, perceptual decision-making
can be significantly affected by the strategy used to scan
the visual scene. A recent study shows that the sequence
of eye-movements affects recognition and categorization of
ambiguous figures [24]. This result can be explained in terms
of dynamic decision-making theories by noticing that, by
performing different scans of the same visual scene, subjects
accumulate more evidence that is consistent with one or the
other alternative. This also implies that (active) sensing is
part of the decision-making process, and not only a source of
input. In keeping with this view, active vision schemes can be
adopted to select information in a top-down manner, depending
on the demands of the task at hand. There is indeed abundant
evidence of top-down guidance of perception and attention
strategies in naturalistic environments, and the anticipatory
search of relevant information [25]. Recently, these insights
have been incorporated in multiple-model architectures of
reinforcement learning, which are able to select gaze loca-
tions depending on utility (or losses) associated to multiple
goals [26], [27]. However, these architectures do not address
problems of perceptual categorization.
Overall, despite the advances in neuroscience and artificial
vision research described so far, knowledge remains scattered
among different communities of neuroscientists and vision re-
searchers. On the one hand, although there is consensus among
neuroscientists that perceptual decision-making is a dynamic
and competitive process, it is still unclear how neural mecha-
nisms studied by neuroscientists in simple perceptual choices
can scale up to more complex visual categorization tasks, and
what elements are used as evidence for the alternatives. On the
other hand, the advanced computational methods developed by
vision researchers and the insights coming from the study of
complex visual tasks (such as the importance of feature-based
representation, predictive processes, and the active guidance
of perception) are rarely studied in neuroscience experiments,
and their neural substrate is incompletely known. In this article
we combine these complementary aspects in a unique system,
which we then test in a human categorization study.
Fig. 1. Sketch of the set-up used in both human and simulated experiments.
After pressing a START button, a visual stimulus is presented centrally. The
task consists in classifying it by pressing (with the mouse) one of the two
buttons (CAT or GIRAFFE). Measuring mouse kinematics permits to unfold
the visual decision in time.
A. A dynamical approach to perceptual decision-making
We pursue a novel approach that combines aspects of
dynamical systems, predictive coding, (modularized) feature-
based schemes, and active vision systems described so far
into an integrated computational architecture for perceptual
categorization. Visual stimuli categorization is modeled as a
dynamic process, in which alternative hypotheses (e.g., giraffe
vs. dog) compete over time. Different from most bottom-up
approaches, in the proposed model competition is solved by
considering the prediction success of the alternative hypothe-
ses. In brief (and with some simplifications, see later), the
neural architecture that we present includes sets of feature
predictors, specific for each category, which continuously
“vote” for one of the alternatives; their votes are only counted
if predictions are correct.
Not only prediction success is used for choice, but also for
selecting the next gaze location of the system fovea. In this
way, the currently leading hypothesis is also the one that steers
an active vision process and influences the way the visual stim-
ulus is probed. As it can influence choice, the active guidance
of the fovea can be considered as a part of the decision-making
process. The use of active perception mechanisms (guided
by prediction success) along with a realistic implementation
of action dynamics and stimuli processing distinguishes our
proposal from related models of categorization that emphasize
dynamic processing [12], competition between features of
objects [13] or their predictive power [28].
To demonstrate the efficacy of our computational approach,
we compare human and system performance in a visual cate-
gorization task. The set-up used in both human and simulated
experiments is sketched in Fig. 1. Essentially, for both the
human and the system, the task consists in classifying a
(shortly presented) visual stimulus as belonging to one of two
categories (e.g., dog vs. giraffe), by clicking one of two buttons
with the mouse. In the experiments, we used visual stimuli
(sketches of animal pictures) belonging to four categories (cat,
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dog, giraffe, and horse) and having two different levels of
ambiguity (low or high). For instance, in a Giraffe vs. Dog
classification, stimuli can be of four different kinds: “proto-
typical” Giraffes, “prototypical” Dogs, or figures obtained by
interpolating the two and conserving more elements from the
former or the latter, respectively. In the first two cases, stimuli
had low ambiguity; in the last two cases, stimuli had high
ambiguity.
To visualize and measure the dynamics of choice in the
human experiment, or their “decision trajectory”, we measured
the continuous mouse movements they made during the task.
This methodology is widely adopted to study the dynamics
of decision making and how they change as a function of
uncertainty, see e.g., [29], [30]1. We hypothesized that, in the
presence of ambiguous figures, human subjects would have
made more classification errors. Furthermore, and more sig-
nificantly for our study, we hypothesized that the trajectories
of their mouse movements would have been less straight, as if
they were more “attracted” by the other category (as compared
to trials with non-ambiguous figures). This hypothesis is con-
sistent with the view that perceptual uncertainties are solved
by a dynamic competition process, in which interpretations
are biased by evidence collected and prediction errors, and in
which initial hypotheses can be revised during the processing.
Not only the continuous measurement of subjects’ mouse
trajectories is important per se, but it also allows comparing
human and system performance. To this aim, we tested our
computational system in the same task as the human subjects.
For each trial, we simulated mouse trajectories by counting
(step-by-step) the “votes” in favor of each alternative, and by
generating a movement vector pointing towards the currently
preferred alternative. Choices that were certain from the be-
ginning resulted in straight trajectories towards the winning
alternative, and uncertain choices generated curve trajectories
and “changes of mind” during the task.
Below we introduce in more detail the human (section II)
and simulated experiments (section III) we performed.
II. METHODS: THE HUMAN EXPERIMENT
A. Ethics Statement
The procedure of the experiment has been approved by
the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies of the
National Research Council, ISTC-CNR of Rome, Italy. All
the participants gave their informed consents.
B. Participants
Eighteen participants took part in the experiment. Age
ranged from 25 to 63 years. All participants were Italian
native speakers, highly educated (university students, people
with master degree or young researchers), and with normal or
corrected to normal vision.
1Note that this methodology is based on the assumption that decision-
making is not completed when the action starts, but is a continuous process
[31]. Traditional models of decision-making do not readily accommodate this
assumption, although they can be extended to do so [32].
Fig. 2. a) Example of a stylized Cat. b) Example of stylized Giraffe. c)
Example of an ambiguous Cat that is also 25% a Giraffe.
C. Materials
A list of ambiguous and unambiguous figures has been used,
for a total of 96 experimental stimuli. The 48 unambiguous
figures represent stylized animals belonging uniformly to
four possible categories: Cat, Dog, Giraffe and Horse. The
stimuli used in this experiment were originally developed by
[33]. The category prototypes were determined by [34]: one
thousand stimuli were initially generated by a software by
considering nine parameters (e.g., head angle, tail length),
and then categorized by eight participants. The average of
responses among these trials produced eight prototype figures
(one for each participants) for each category.
The 48 ambiguous figures used in our study were generated
by randomly choosing two prototypes belonging to different
categories (e.g., Cat and Giraffe), and then applying a mor-
phing procedure, which varied their nine parameters along a
continuum between the two categories (e.g., between the head
angle mean of Cat and Giraffe). This procedure permitted
to produce figures that are “intermediate” between two cat-
egories, using a morphing coefficient µ in [0, 1]. Specifically,
we selected figures belonging for the 75% to one of the
two categories, and 25% to the other (e.g., an ambiguous
Cat that is also 25% Giraffe). Examples of unambiguous and
ambiguous figures of stylized animal are shown in Fig. 2(a,b)
and Fig. 2(c), respectively.
D. Procedure
At the beginning of each trial, participants clicked on the
/START/ button located bottom-centre of the PC screen (see
Fig. 1). Then stimuli appeared and participants had 800ms
to make their response (i.e., to move the mouse cursor and
click on one of the two response buttons), otherwise a /TIME
OUT/ message appeared. Response buttons were labelled with
words standing for categories (e.g., /CAT/). One button was
always associated with the correct response category, while the
other was either a random category (for unambiguous stimuli)
or the other category considered in the morphing procedure
described so far (in the case of ambiguous stimuli). In other
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words, ambiguous stimuli were always used in decisions
concerning the two morphed categories. Words were presented
in ARIAL font, upper case, black on a white background,
located respectively top-left or top-right of the PC screen, on
the basis of a random choice. Also correspondence between
stimulus type and button were varied randomly across trials
and participants. In case of errors, a feedback message (red
cross) appeared after the response.
During subject responses, categorization errors and the
x and y coordinates of mouse trajectories were recorded
automatically (sampling rate of approximately 70Hz) using
MouseTracker. Such software package was used to record,
process, and analyze mouse movements [35]. Before starting
with experimental data acquisition, participants performed a
practice session with 10 items to familiarize with the pro-
cedure. The 96 experimental stimuli were presented in two
blocks of 48 items each. The order of stimuli within blocks
and the order of blocks presentation were randomized.
E. Results
1) Data Processing: Error rate and mouse trajectories were
analyzed under two conditions: in the presence of ambigu-
ous and unambiguous stimuli. In the trajectory analysis we
discarded wrong responses (i.e., when the subject selected
the inappropriate stimulus category) which were the 19% of
total data. This high error rate is explained by the task speed
constraint and the ambiguity of half the stimuli.
We used the Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) to study
the effect of ambiguity on the response variables. Stimulus am-
biguity was considered as a Fixed-effect factor and Items and
Subjects were considered as Random-effects factors. Among
the two conditions the unambiguous one was taken as default
level of comparison.
For each dependent variable (i.e., trajectory’s parameters
and accuracy) an independent analysis was conducted. Anal-
yses were run with the lm4 package for R [36], were p
values were estimated by using Markov chain Monte Carlo
simulations [37].
2) Accuracy Rate Analysis: For each condition, mean ac-
curacy rate was computed across all participants and trials.
As expected, participant were less accurate in categorizing
ambiguous stimuli (M = 0.25, SD = 0.43) than unambiguous
stimuli (M = 0.14, SD = 0.35). Such difference was
statistically significant as shown by mixed-effects models on
accuracy rate (β = 0.102, pMCMC < 0.008).
3) Trajectories Analysis: In Fig. 3, the mean trajectories
of the two conditions across all trials are shown. The mean
trajectory for the ambiguous condition has a pronounced
curvature, whereas the mean trajectory for the unambiguous
condition is closer to the ideal straight line of response,
meaning that trajectories for the ambiguous condition were
more attracted to the opposite alternatives. Curvature of the
trajectory signals that uncertainty of choice is present during
the time course of the decision.
To analyze formally the structure of trajectories, we consid-
ered their Area Under the Curve (AUC), which is a measure
of spatial attraction toward the unselected alternative. It is
Fig. 3. Mean trajectories in the two conditions. Note that they were
“remapped”, as if all responses were made to the right.
calculated as the geometric area between the actual trajectory
and the idealized straight line trajectory from the /START/
button toward the selected response. Again, the mean value
and standard deviation for the ambiguous stimuli (M =
0.92, SD = 1.59) were higher than those in the unambiguous
condition (M = 0.74, SD = 1.44).
AUC was analyzed using the Linear Mixed-Effects model
with stimulus ambiguity as Fixed-effects factor and Subjects
and Items as two Random-effects factors. The unambiguous
condition was taken as reference condition. Positive contrast
coefficient for ambiguous stimuli (β = 0.17, pMCMC < 0.05)
shows that average AUC was significantly higher for unam-
biguous stimuli.
F. Discussion
Consistent with our hypothesis, uncertainty in visual stimuli
affects participants’ performance, with higher number of errors
and trajectory curvature for ambiguous items. We focus on the
analysis of movement trajectories, which is more informative
than errors of the dynamics of choice. The fact that trajectories
are more attracted by the unselected category in ambiguous
conditions (compared to unambiguous conditions) is consistent
with previous categorization studies [38] and can be explained
within a within a dynamical system framework, in which
multiple options are computed in parallel and compete over
time [31]. In our task, the unselected category is able to
function (quite literally) as an “attractor” of the choice (and the
mouse trajectory). In the presence of uncertainty, the attractor
is stronger and exerts significant influence over the choice. The
competition between alternatives is not solved prior to (overt)
action onset, but continues during the task, as the partial results
of the competition continuously flow into motor movements;
this can explain the curvature of the (mouse) trajectories and
the “changes of mind” as resulting from the dynamics and
uncertainty during the choice. This pattern of results is not
unique of our task, but has been consistently reported in
several studies including lexical decision, numerical decision,
and objects categorization [39], [29], [30]. To explain these
findings, several researchers have developed dynamical models
that incorporate competitive processes. For example, [40]
implemented a dynamic competitive model of choice that suc-
cessfully explains the results of a “phonological competitor”
task [41] (but see [42] for an alternative explanation that
consider perception as a serial rather than parallel process).
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Eye-tracking studies in perceptual tasks (e.g., spoken word
with phonological competitors [43], [44]) also support the idea
of a dynamic competition by showing that a proportion of
eye movements is directed to the unselected choice when it is
phonologically similar to the correct one.
We consider this dynamical view of choice, which is largely
consistent with neurophysiological evidence (collected using
simpler set-ups, though), to be the key of our theoretical
and computational proposal, and we argue that it applies to
perceptual decisions at large. Below we introduce a com-
putational model that uses dynamic competition at its core
for dealing with perceptual ambiguities in the same task as
described before. Not only our model incorporates the afore-
mentioned aspects of dynamic competition and continuous
flow of information, but it also has several distinguishing
features. First, it considers prediction success as a source
of evidence, thus highlighting the importance of predictive
processes in the regulation of the competition between the
competing choices. Prediction is used in combination with a
feature-based representation of the stimuli, which permits to
address perceptual categorization tasks that are significantly
more complex that those adopted in the neuroscience literature.
Second, it explicitly models the eye movements used for
collecting evidence, using an active perception process that
samples informative features from the stimulus. Third, it
explicitly models the response dynamics (mouse movements).
III. METHODS: THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
The computational model presented here implements cate-
gorization as a competition between two (or more) different
sets of feature predictors, each associated with a prototype or
figure, assumed to be known by the agent (see Fig. 4). To allow
a fair comparison, the artificial system interacts with the exact
same MouseTracker setup used for the human experiment (but
we replaced words with stick figures). The purpose of this
computational experiment is to show how dynamic decision-
making can emerge from pure sensorimotor interaction, where
distributed predictors continuously compete for action, thus
not directly relying on more abstract concepts.
Two Java applets are provided in the supplementary mate-
rial: the former demonstrates how stick figures were generated
(StickFigureGenerator.jar), and the latter permits the user (or
the artificial controller) to perform the task and see its results
(StickFigureDecision.jar).
A. Input features
The input provided to the system is an equivalent of the
view of the display for the human. It includes the current
position of the mouse pointer, general information about the
trial (targets categories, current feedback or signal provided to
the user) and a small foveated area that can be freely moved
around the stimulus. The system has only partial knowledge
of the figure at any time, and has to actively explore it by
generating saccades.
As our experiment focuses on the fast online recognition
and disambiguation of figures, and the artificial controller
does not benefit from the highly robust human visual system,
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preprocessing the visual input is necessary to rival human
performance (without a complex learning phase). To this
aim, we adopted a feature-based representation of the stimuli.
To select the right features (i.e. leading to feasible but not
trivial discrimination between the stimuli) we computed neuro-
inspired saliency maps of the stick figures [45]. Coherent
with results on the use of coarse scales to rapidly categorize
complex stimuli [46], a strong response could always be
observed for contrast and orientation detectors near joints and
would be sufficient for the task.
To lower the dimensionality of the input and make the
model easier to interpret, only a set of feature points (fi)
corresponding to the visible joints of the stick figure are
retained for each fixation. In addition to its coordinates within
the retinal image (u, v), each feature is described by a vector
synthesizing the oriented Gabor filters responses away from
the joint (oj)j∈[1,M ]. In practice, overlapping Gaussian tuning
curves are used to directly generate the vector from the
stick figure description (see Eq. 1). This method converts an
arbitrary set of orientations into a fixed number of correlated
activities (see Fig. 5). Notice that there is no way for the
system to easily discriminate between the front and back legs
without exploring the stimulus by generating saccades.
oj = max
l
exp−
(
M(θj − ρl)
2pi
)2
(1)
where θj = −pi + jpi/M (with M fixed to 16 in the
experiments), and ρl is the set of angles formed by the sticks
starting from the considered joint.
Features are thus fully described by fi = (u, v, o1, . . . , oM )
and two features (f1, f2) can be compared according to a
similarity measure defined as:
σ(f1, f2) = 1− e−
‖f2−f1‖2
σ2 (2)
where ‖.‖ is a norm in RM+2 with an adequate weighting of
the various dimensions involved.
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B. Output commands
The system controls both saccades and mouse movements.
Cartesian coordinates are used to move the retina over the
image, but there is no need for the sensations and commands
to share the same coordinate system. Efferent signals remain
separated from proprioceptive feedback, and their coupling
is only achieved through the use of predictors at the core
of the system (see below). Saccades are considered instan-
taneous, thus approximating the human system, where the
fixation/saccade temporal ratio is high, and inhibition is often
posited to occur during movement.
The mouse pointer controller also uses Cartesian coordi-
nates in the screen frame of reference. A speed vector v is
provided at all times by the predictive part of the architecture,
and is integrated through an Euler scheme. Combined with a
fixed speed limit, the system generates smooth trajectories on
the screen with semi-realistic dynamics.
C. Predictive representations
The core of the architecture is composed of a set of predic-
tors (pk), each anticipating a feature f
tgt
k to be observed after
performing a saccade sk = (δxk, δyk) from an initial context
were the feature fsrck was present. Predictors are also specific
to a stick figure and are thus also associated to the mouse
reaching movement towards the corresponding target category
c{1,2}. Such predictors introduce normativity at the core of
the representations by simply suggesting the potentiality of
observing some feature after performing an action, potentiality
that can only be confirmed through interaction. This kind
of models has proponents from theoretical [47], [48], [15],
[49], experimental [50], and computational approaches [51],
especially in the domain of neo-Piagetian and sensorimotor
perspectives of cognition.
Each predictor continuously tries to assimilate the interac-
tions the agent engages in, by updating a set of associated
activities defined by:
apropk = a
reac
k ∗ σ(sk, s)
apredk = a
prop
k × (maxi{σ(fi, f tgtk )} − β)
areack = maxi{σ(fi, fsrck )}
ainhibk = max((1− α)ainhibk , apropk )
ak = areack − γ2 ∗ ainhibk + γ1 ∗ c{1,2}
(3)
where all overlined variables integrate the actual system dy-
namics, by compensating for induced shifts in commands and
sensations when another predictor has been selected to control
the retina.
apropk corresponds to the proprioceptive feedback determin-
ing if the predictor action is similar to the one previously
selected. apredk then evaluates the satisfaction of the expected
consequences for this predictor, only if this predictor was
compatible with the previous action taken. It is indeed possible
to get a perfect match for features when non matching actions
are performed if the stick figure belongs to another category.
areack evaluates how much the predictor context matches the
current situation, thus limiting the action selection mechanism
to at least potentially adequate predictors.
ainhibk is an inhibition of return term, preventing the system
to keep checking the same successful predictions again and
again. This contributes to implement a basic mechanism of
informativeness, as there is little information to be obtained
from the same fixation points on static stimuli.
Finally ak combines these activities to determine if this
predictor should be selected for controlling the saccade system.
The c{1,2} term biases the selection of predictors for categories
that have already received support from the predictors, leading
to an increased stability in the decision making process.
We assume that a set of adequate predictors has already been
learned for each prototype, at least sufficient to discriminate
between the proposed figures. This is coherent with the ability
of humans to consistently associate a figure with an abstract
concept such as an animal species or category. In accordance
with the prototype theory of categorization [52] and the notion
of conceptual spaces [53], the prototype has been chosen as the
average figure in the multidimensional space of joint angles
and stick lengths. However, we do not address here the debate
between the different views on classification, and we could as
well consider an arbitrary set of examples within one category
while using the same similarity measure [54]. By simply
sharing the category bias, basins of attraction corresponding
to individual examples at the vision level can be merged into a
single non convex representation of a category at the reaching
level, whereas a prototype-based version implies convexity.
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D. Action selection
The simplified algorithm below presents the global loop
in which the perception and decision-making processes
are performed. All predictors are updated based on the
dynamics of the MouseTracker system, under the various task
constraints and in response to the artificial agent’s commands,
as follows:
1. for all predictors (pk)
2. Update apropk , a
pred
k , a
reac
k , a
inhib
k , ak
3. end
4. Select the top ak predictor to control the saccade
5. Move the retina to a new fixation point (x, y)
6. for all categories (ci)
7. Update ci with the best associated a
pred
k
8. end
9. Make the categories (ci) compete for action
10. Move the mouse using the resulting speed vector
In addition to the predictors, a reactive saccade system is
implemented to avoid the controller to saccade away from
the stimulus. This might happen in the initial build-up phase
of the predictors activity or if the stimuli is too dissimilar
from any known category. In both cases, the system might
select an inadequate predictor, that will lead to an area without
any visible feature, thus preventing further recognition. In the
same vein as the subsumption architecture [55], the reactive
system can take control over the predictive system, inhibiting
its output to lead the retina back to the closest salient point.
A more dynamistic way of presenting this mechanism is to
consider competition between a relatively general yet static
reactive process and several object-specific acquired predictive
processes. The two mechanisms are complementary, reactivity
being needed to bootstrap predictions and to cope with errors,
while prediction is necessary for selective attention in active
vision. In the end, the saccade to be performed is thus
determined by:
s =
{
sargmaxk{ak} if maxk{ak} > aRSS
sRSS otherwise
(4)
where sRSS and aRSS respectively are the saccade and fixed
activity of the reactive saccade system.
The control of the mouse movements is then adjusted in
order to reflect the new information accumulated by the agent.
For this purpose, the activities associated with each category
are updated by accumulating evidence from the predictors,
following equation 5.
ci = λci +maxk∈Pi{apredk }
ci = ci∑
i
ci
(5)
where Pi is the subset of predictors associated with target
category ci and λ an inertia coefficient, so as to limit the effect
of isolated match or mismatch of expected consequences. As
a side effect, λ also avoids abrupt changes in the motor
commands, thus compensating for the absence of a more
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scanpath 
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Fig. 6. Description of the predictive dynamics. Given that previous saccades
before time t led to almost no discrimination between the prototypes, a fixation
on the head of the figure will mainly activate the predictors associated with
testing the neck length for both prototypes (i.e. saccading to the next salient
feature at the shoulder). Once a saccade in this direction is performed, the
system can measure the similarity of the observed features with expected
consequences of the movement, here giving an advantage to the left prototype.
If confirmed by further predictions, the resulting bias will allow the trajectory
to bifurcate towards one of the target and the decision to be made.
realistic motor apparatus in the simulations. The normalization
process used to obtain ci from ci guarantees a bounded activity
in [0, 1] and puts into competition the two categories. As our
set-up only considers two categories for each trial, it does
not require using more complex mechanisms of competition
using reciprocal inhibition; however, the proposed model can
be easily extended to incorporate such mechanisms. Indeed,
attentional capabilities and increased robustness are required
when the set of potentialities offered to the system increases.
Committing to neuro-inspired models, dynamic neural field
models allow such properties to emerge and can be applied
to the sensory signals and categories [56] or directly to the
predictors by using a high dimensional implementation [57].
Finally, the command sent for moving the pointer is a linear
combination of the normalized vectors v{1,2} aiming at the two
visible targets from the current mouse position (see Fig. 6):
v =
∑
i
ci × vi (6)
E. Results
1) Trajectories Analysis: Using the same protocol as in the
human experiment, i.e. 18 artificial participants and 96 trials,
the artificial system generates trajectories qualitatively similar
to humans. Mean values and standard deviations obtained
for the AUC measure are (M = 0.46, SD = 0.27) for the
ambiguous and (M = 0.30, SD = 0.10) for the unambiguous
stimuli. Using a paired T-test between the two conditions, the
average AUC was significantly higher for ambiguous stimuli
(pT−test < 0.0001). We also find significant but weaker results
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Fig. 7. Area Under Curve (AUC) and time to target (RT) as a function
of the speed constraint, averaged over all prototypes, morphing coefficients
and simulated participants. The target reaching time is limited by the amount
of information gathered during each saccade, instead of following an inverse
function of speed (e.g. 0.226 instead of 0.154 seconds for a speed of 9.75
screen units per second). This is also reflected in the AUC, that almost linearly
increases with the speed constraint.
on reaction times (RT), underlying the interest of a finer anal-
ysis on the trajectory (M = 0.93, SD = 0.02 in unambiguous
vs M = 0.96, SD = 0.08 in ambiguous condition). Variability
in the computational model comes from the initial fixation
point, which can make a huge difference in the bifurcation
dynamics involved, due the complex system nature of the
predictor-based controller. It is however much lower compared
to the human data, as the simulated participants have a much
lower intra-group variability.
The computational model we presented permits to run
additional synthetic experiments by manipulating the sys-
tem parameters. By increasing the maximal speed of mouse
movements, and increasing the time constraint to reach a
decision imposed to the system, higher standard deviation
and contrast coefficient are obtained for the AUC distri-
bution. Indeed, within a fixed amount of time, the same
information will be gathered by the system through saccades,
but a larger mouse movement will occur. Additionally, any
error in the best predictor and saccade selection will lead to
greater deviations from the ideal straight trajectory, as shown
on Fig. 7 (all locations, speeds and AUCs are respectively
expressed in MouseTracker units u, units per second, and
squared units). On the contrary, when totally alleviating the
time constraints, the average AUC is drastically decreased
and there is no significant difference between the ambiguous
and unambiguous conditions anymore. The dynamics of the
decision process is then hidden in the first few milliseconds of
the reaching movement. In a similar vein, human experiments
have also shown that time constraints must be severe for other
phenomena such as assimilation effects to be experimentally
observed [58].
Using our computational system it is possible to increase the
difficulty of the task by using highly ambiguous stimuli, up
to a morphing coefficient µ of 0.5 (this manipulation would
be hard to do in human experiments, as in the presence of
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Fig. 8. Area Under Curve (AUC) as a function of the morphing coefficient
µ used for generating the stimuli, averaged over all prototypes and simulated
participants. The AUC roughly follows a power function of the ambiguity,
showing that coming to a definite decision becomes progressively harder
when ambiguity increases, thus reflecting the non-linear system of equations
governing the competition process between the two target prototypes.
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Fig. 9. Mouse trajectories generated by the artificial agent under various
conditions. At low speed (LS), 3 representative trajectories are provided
for a morphing factor in {0.1, 0.25, 0.5}, with increasing deviation from
the straight trajectory. For high speed (HS) and high ambiguity (morphing
coefficient of 0.5), the late change in decision during the reaching movement
is amplified compared to the LS - 0.5 condition.
stimuli that are too ambiguous subjects might adopt higher-
level strategies, such as deliberately responding in a random
manner). As in this system the decision process emerges from
complex dynamic interactions between predictors, response
accuracy does not degrade linearly (see Fig. 8). Nevertheless,
for a morphing coefficient varying in [0.0, 0.5], the AUC
increases from 0.281 to 0.725. The values obtained for 0.0 and
0.25 are consistent with the above results on another set of data
when also respectively considering 1.0 and 0.75 coefficients,
showing that the attraction dynamics towards the prototypes
is almost symmetric.
2) Qualitative Analysis: These quantitative results are ex-
plained by the non linearities and late changes in decisions
that can be observed on individual reaching trajectories (see
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Fig. 9). In turn, these phenomena result from the inertia
of the predictors and the equal average amount of evidence
accumulated for each prototype in the most ambiguous cases.
The non linear dynamics of the predictors activity comes
from the feedback involved in the equations and through
interaction with the MouseTracker environment. This feedback
is modulated by the context, but even its nature (positive or
negative) is determined by the satisfaction of the predictions.
Predictors belonging to the same category are linked, so they
benefit from the bias γ1 ∗ c{1,2} in Eq. 3. At the same time,
they influence each other through the environment, as an action
triggered by one predictor can create a favorable context to
trigger the activity of another predictor. Therefore, the move-
ments of both the mouse and the eye have an influence on the
overall dynamics. Reciprocally, the satisfaction of prediction
term apredk facilitates rapid bifurcations, as it contributes to
saccade selection through the category bias, and determines
mouse movements over time.
Predictors voting for the same category reinforce each
other and steer the mouse movements towards their associated
target. At the same time, they compete for controlling the
saccades. At the category level, they discriminate among
figures; individually, they discriminate among different parts
of a figure. Overall, the competition dynamics emerges from a
set of intertwined factors, which we list below (for simplicity,
we only consider two arbitrary predictors):
• If they apply to different contexts (fsrc1 6= fsrc2 ), the
discrimination will occur at the sensory level, either
because they are associated with different parts within
the figures (head vs tail for instance) or because the
stimulus highly differs from the prototype (e.g. different
neck orientations).
• If they propose different actions (s1 6= s2), the one
associated with the performed saccade will have better
chances to see its expected consequences confirmed, as
features must fall within the visual field. If the context and
expected consequences are similar enough (fsrc1 ' fsrc2
and f tgt1 ' f tgt2 ), the proprioceptive feedback alone can
lead to discrimination (e.g. short vs long neck).
• If only the expected consequences differ (f tgt1 6= f tgt2 ),
selecting the common action will lead to discrimination,
either between prototypes or between parts of the figures
(e.g. front vs back legs that can only be distinguished at
the hip or shoulder level).
• If two predictors are almost identical, selecting them does
not bring additional information for categorization, as
they correspond to common parts of stick figures.
In the end, and due to competition between categories, only
the relative distance to each prototype in the sensorimotor
space matters for the final decision dynamics. This is true
up to the discriminative power of the sensory apparatus, here
limited by the standard deviation and norm characteristics in
the similarity measure σ (see Eq. 2). However, this relative
distance to the prototypes can only be ascertained statistically;
by visually interacting with the stimulus, and under strict
time constraints, this process leads to the complex dynamics
observed.
 no bias c) b) a) no inhib full model 
Fig. 10. Density of fixations at the end of a trial, in three cases: a) without
the inhibition of return, b) full model, c) without the top-down bias. a)
Without the simple embedded informativeness mechanism, the system has
higher probability to converge on limit cycles of saccades where no decision
can be made. c) When saccades are selected based on reactive mechanisms,
the system tends to focus lass on adequate features.
F. Model decomposition
1) Prediction: To highlight the usefulness of prediction
with ambiguous stimuli in the context of this study, we
compared the proposed system with a reactive controller. In the
reactive controller, observed features are passively matched to
all features associated with each prototype figure to calculate
areack (instead, the full system uses a mechanism for matching
expected and observed features and calculating apredk ).
Like the full system, the reactive controller produces sig-
nificant differences for the AUC (M = 1.99, SD = 0.10 for
the unambiguous vs M = 2.13, SD = 0.08 for the ambiguous
condition, pT−test < 0.0001), and the RT (M = 5.19, SD =
2.05 to M = 9.39, SD = 5.03, pT−test < 0.001). The lack
of the predictive component, however, leads to a significant
increase in the mean values of both the AUC and RT, reflecting
the difficulty and longer time required to reach a decision.
Outliers had to be removed for these quantitative results
to be meaningful (RT above 3 SD from the mean), even
though a large standard deviation can still be observed for
the reaction times in the ambiguous condition. These outliers
provide an insight on the type of configurations that lead to
non discriminant fixation patterns. Although the associated
target prototypes may visually seem quite different, the set
of features associated with the figure joints overlap. Fixations
alone may be no more sufficient for the discrimination, and
the organization of the joints should then be exploited through
saccades.
Moreover, and following this qualitative line of reasoning,
the non-predictive system also looses access to most informa-
tion on the stick lengths since they are encoded in the saccades
amplitude. This is experimentally confirmed by considering
two categories where all features are identical, but for the
length of a single stick (for instance a short-necked vs long-
necked giraffe). Although the pattern of visual exploration
still relies on a simple inhibition of return mechanism, thus
saccading back and forth over most of the uninformative
elements of the figure, the model without prediction cannot
differentiate the two figures.
2) Top-down modulation: Reciprocal to the bottom-up in-
fluence of the prediction on decision making is the bias
from the abstract category activity (c{1,2}) on the active
vision process and the emergent saccade pattern. Nullifying γ1
removes the associated modulation of the predictors activity,
and allows us to analyze the dynamics without any top-down
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS: PART A 10
feedback.
This change in the equations is of course reflected in a
loss of performance for the system, but its effect can be
more easily interpreted on heatmaps representing the density
of fixations on the stimulus (compare Fig.10b and 10c). By
boosting predictors associated with the current most probable
categories, the system limits the number of fixations away
from the figure and thus actively improves the informativeness
of the fixations and speeds up the convergence on a decision.
The fixation heatmaps presented here and the behavioral
measures of the reaching dynamics introduced before do not
aim at precisely mapping human data, but at reproducing
qualitatively their pattern. Although this would have been
possible, we did not tune the parameters of the system (listed
in Table I) to exactly reproduce human data, because parameter
values lying within an acceptable range (e.g. not making the
whole figure visible within the field of view) most yielded
the same qualitative results; manipulating the parameters in a
meaningful way would have required a lot of data not directly
accessible in our behavioral experiments. Furthermore, human
data depend on kinematic parameters that are highly simplified
in our mouse controller.
3) Informativeness: The usefulness and efficiency of the
inhibition of return mechanism can also be ascertained by
deactivating it. This is done in the model by setting γ2 to
0, thus canceling the effect of ainhibk on a
reac
k .
The consequence can be observed on the heatmaps (com-
pare Fig. 10a and 10b). Without inhibition of return, the system
converges on limit cycles of saccades from which it can hardly
escape by only using the bias. Indeed, predictors prime each
other through the environment and (if they belong to the same
prototype) activate each other; with no inhibition of return,
this mutual excitation cannot be counterbalanced. Based on
the informativeness of the fixation points within the limit cycle
attractor, the system may be able to reach a decision or not.
Overall, the analysis of the model dynamics leads to several
predictions on human perceptual decision making, including
the following: the ambiguity effect should be amplified or
disappear when time constraints become more or less severe,
respectively; in most cases, the perceptual boundary between
two categories may not correspond to a morphing coefficient of
0.5; constraining eye movements or observed features should
lead to qualitative changes in the decision dynamics and
fixation patterns. Testing these predictions in further human
experiments (possibly using MouseTracker in combination
with a eye tracker) might help validating or refining the
proposed model.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Perceptual decision-making has been extensively studied in
neuroscience and artificial vision research. Most experiments
in neuroscience focused on simple perceptual choices, such as
for instance the direction of motion of dots having different
degrees of coherence [1], [2]. These studies permitted to
describe the basic neural mechanisms of perceptual choice in
terms of stochastic and dynamic processes [7], [3], [31]. At the
same time, it is unclear if and how these mechanisms scale to
TABLE I
PARAMETERS VALUES IN THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
Symbol Value Description
r 0.4 Radius of the retina (defining the visible features)
M 16 Number of preferred input feature orientations
σo1..M 1.0 Standard deviation of the features Gaussian profile
σu/v 0.2 Standard deviation of the location Gaussian profile
α 0.1 Decay coefficient for the inhibition of return
β 0.5 Average proprioceptive activity (normalization)
γ1 0.1 Influence of the top-down bias on the predictors
γ2 0.1 Influence of the inhibition of return
aRSS 0.1 Threshold activity for the reactive/predictive control
λ 5 Inertia coefficient for the accumulation of evidences
vmax 10 Maximal speed for the mouse movement (default)
more complex perceptual tasks such as those typically studied
in vision research, which usually involve complex perceptual
stimuli and are addressed using feature-based representations,
hierarchical and/or generative architectures [20], [22].
In this article, we propose dynamic competition as a general
mechanism for perceptual decision-making of whatever com-
plexity. The proposed model incorporates several insights of
the aforementioned models of decision-making and categoriza-
tion, such as dynamic competition via evidence accumulation.
At the same time, our proposal has several distinguishing
features. Prediction dynamics are proposed as the key principle
that regulates the dynamic competition. In our model, predic-
tion has a double role: it provides information (evidence) to
be accumulated during the dynamic decision-making, and it
guides the perceptual processing actively. This idea is com-
patible with recent theories, such as predictive coding, which
emphasize the importance of top-down predictive processes in
guiding perceptual processing [14], [16], [17], [15]; however,
rather than minimizing prediction error, our system considers
prediction success as a source of evidence within a dynamical
system framework.
Furthermore, our model assigns a key role to active per-
ception processes in the guidance of the perceptual catego-
rizations. In this respect, it is worth noting that our active
perception model is highly simplified compared to the control
of human eye movements. Its main significance lies in the
proposal that also evidence selection is a competitive process
guided by task demands; however, evidence selection includes
overt (e.g., eye movements) and covert (e.g., attention modu-
lation) processes, which are at the moment mixed up in our
model. We leave the improvement and validation of our active
perception model as an open objective for future research.
Overall, our emphasis on predictions and active perception
stands in contrast with the idea that evidence accumulation
is a purely bottom-up process. Taken together, these elements
constitute a theory of how multiple predictors compete over
time for making a (perceptual) decision, and do so by both
“voting” for one of the alternative and actively biasing the
selection of relevant information. Consistent with embodied
and sensorimotor accounts of categorization, the proposed
system incorporates implicit knowledge of the categories in the
form of sets of linked (feature) predictors, and contingencies
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between saccades and stimuli [59], [50], [60]. By re-enacting
its predictors, the system is able to successfully explore and
categorize the stimuli. The model can be extended to include
multi-step or probabilistic predictions that incorporate more
complex relations between saccades and stimuli.
Feature-based representations are also central to our ar-
chitecture, as they permit splitting the problem space and
designing controllers and predictors at a manageable level
of abstraction. A feature-based approach has proven useful
to address perceptual tasks that are far more complex than
those used in neuroscience studies [22]. By incorporating
features into our model, we provide a link between dynamic
competitive processes in simple perceptual tasks (e.g., using
random dots) and more complex ones, suggesting that the
latter consists in a competition between feature-based repre-
sentations. Finally, our model incorporates response dynamics,
which are rarely considered in categorization studies (for one
exception, see [61]).
Although the same computational model has already been
successfully applied to navigation [62] and control [63] in
robotics (see also [64], [60], [65] for related proposals), it is to
our knowledge the first time such distributed prediction- and
competition-based system is used to model dynamic decision-
making in humans. Performance of our system is assessed in
a perceptual categorization of intermediate complexity (i.e.,
more complex that tasks usually adopted in neuroscientific
studies, still less complex than the recognition of natural im-
ages). The use of a continuous measure of performance (mouse
movements) permitted us to better look at the dynamics of
decision during the task.
The comparison with human performance suggests that the
system captures fundamental principles of decision-making,
such as the sensitivity to perceptual ambiguities. Not only
this affects the number of errors, but it also influences the
on-line dynamics of decision, as revealed by the analysis of
trajectories during task performance.
In this respect, our dynamic computational model describes
decision-making as a continuous process in which perceptual
processing, choice and (eye and hand) action performance all
co-occur and influence one another, revealing that the embod-
iment of choice is indeed part and parcel of it [66]. In sum,
this combined computational and human study suggests that
fundamental mechanisms with which the brain implements
perceptual decision-making and solves perceptual ambiguities
can be extended to explain visual categorization tasks that are
significantly more complex than the ones typically addressed
in neuroscientific studies. We argue that these principles
should guide the design of artificial systems that apply in
naturalistic domains, and in turn that the advancements in the
realization of artificial systems could be heuristically useful
to explore the neural substrate of harder perceptual choices in
living organisms.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Adam Sanborn for useful
comments and for providing the experimental stimuli. The
research leading to these results has received funding from
the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreements 224919 (WoRHD,
supporting LB), and 270108 (Goal-Leaders, supporting GP),
and 231281 (EuCogII, which sponsored JCQ’s visit to ISTC-
CNR in Rome).
REFERENCES
[1] J. Gold and M. Shadlen, “Neural computations that underlie decisions
about sensory stimuli,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 5, pp. 10–16,
2001.
[2] J. I. Gold and M. N. Shadlen, “The neural basis of decision making.”
Annu Rev Neurosci, vol. 30, pp. 535–574, 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.113038
[3] R. Ratcliff, “A theory of memory retrieval,” Psychological Review,
vol. 85, pp. 59–108, 1978.
[4] M. Usher and J. L. McClelland, “On the time course of perceptual
choice: The leaky, competing accumulator model.” Psychological Re-
view, vol. 108(3), pp. 550–592, 2001.
[5] K.-F. Wong, A. C. Huk, M. N. Shadlen, and X.-J. Wang, “Neural circuit
dynamics underlying accumulation of time-varying evidence during
perceptual decision making.” Front Comput Neurosci, vol. 1, p. 6,
2007. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/neuro.10.006.2007
[6] Diederich, “Dynamic stochastic models for decision making under time
constraints,” J Math Psychol, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 260–274, Sep 1997.
[7] R. Bogacz, E. Brown, J. Moehlis, P. Holmes, and J. D. Cohen,
“The physics of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of
models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks.” Psychol
Rev, vol. 113, no. 4, pp. 700–765, Oct 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.113.4.700
[8] M. Shadlen, R. Kiani, T. Hanks, and A. Churchland, “Neurobiology of
decision making: An intentional framework,” in Better than conscious?:
decision making, the human mind, and implications for institutions,
C. Engel and W. Singer, Eds. The MIT Press, 2008.
[9] A. Tosoni, G. Galati, G. L. Romani, and M. Corbetta, “Sensory-
motor mechanisms in human parietal cortex underlie arbitrary visual
decisions.” Nat Neurosci, vol. 11, no. 12, pp. 1446–1453, Dec 2008.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn.2221
[10] D. J. Freedman and J. A. Assad, “A proposed common neural
mechanism for categorization and perceptual decisions.” Nat Neurosci,
vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 143–146, Feb 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn.2740
[11] P. Cisek and J. F. Kalaska, “Neural mechanisms for
interacting with a world full of action choices.” Annu Rev
Neurosci, vol. 33, pp. 269–298, 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.051508.135409
[12] R. M. Nosofsky and T. J. Palmeri, “An exemplar-based random walk
model of speeded classification.” Psychol Rev, vol. 104, no. 2, pp. 266–
300, Apr 1997.
[13] K. Lamberts, “Information-accumulation theory of speeded categoriza-
tion.” Psychol Rev, vol. 107, no. 2, pp. 227–260, Apr 2000.
[14] M. Bar, “The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to
generate predictions,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 11, no. 7, pp.
280–289, 2007.
[15] G. Pezzulo, “Coordinating with the future: the anticipatory nature of
representation,” Minds and Machines, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 179–225, 2008.
[16] K. Friston, “A theory of cortical responses.” Philos Trans R Soc Lond
B Biol Sci, vol. 360, no. 1456, pp. 815–836, Apr 2005. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2005.1622
[17] ——, “The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?” Nat Rev
Neurosci, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 127–138, Feb 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn2787
[18] R. P. Rao and D. H. Ballard, “Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a
functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects,”
Nat Neurosci, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 79–87, January 1999. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/4580
[19] Y. Bengio and Y. Lecun, Scaling learning algorithms
towards AI. MIT Press, 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/publis/index.html#bengio-lecun-07
[20] G. E. Hinton, “Learning multiple layers of representation.” Trends
Cogn Sci, vol. 11, no. 10, pp. 428–434, Oct 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.004
[21] B. Epshtein and S. Ullman, “Semantic Hierarchies for Recognizing
Objects and Parts,” in IEEE Computer Society Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2007.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN AND CYBERNETICS: PART A 12
[22] S. Ullman, M. Vidal-Naquet, and E. Sali, “Visual features of
intermediate complexity and their use in classification.” Nat
Neurosci, vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 682–687, Jul 2002. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn870
[23] D. Ballard, “Animate vision,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 48, no. 1, pp.
1–27, 1991.
[24] T. C. Kietzmann, S. Geuter, and P. Koenig, “Overt visual
attention as a causal factor of perceptual awareness.” PLoS
One, vol. 6, no. 7, p. e22614, 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022614
[25] M. Hayhoe and D. Ballard, “Eye movements in natural behavior.”
Trends Cogn Sci, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 188–194, Apr 2005. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.02.009
[26] C. A. Rothkopf and D. H. Ballard, “Credit assignment in multiple goal
embodied visuomotor behavior.” Front Psychol, vol. 1, p. 173, 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00173
[27] N. Sprague and D. Ballard, “Multiple-goal reinforcement learning with
modular sarsa(o,” University of Rochester Computer Science, Tech.
Rep., 2003.
[28] J. K. Kruschke, “Alcove: An exemplar-based connectionist model of
category learning,” Psychological Review, vol. 99, pp. 22–44, 1992.
[29] J. B. Freeman, R. Dale, and T. A. Farmer, “Hand in motion reveals
mind in motion.” Front Psychol, vol. 2, p. 59, 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00059
[30] J.-H. Song and K. Nakayama, “Hidden cognitive states
revealed in choice reaching tasks.” Trends Cogn Sci,
vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 360–366, Aug 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.009
[31] M. Spivey, The continuity of mind. Oxford University Press, USA,
2007.
[32] A. Resulaj, R. Kiani, D. M. Wolpert, and M. N. Shadlen, “Changes of
mind in decision-making,” Nature, vol. 461, no. 7261, pp. 263–266,
August 2009. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature08275
[33] C. Olman and D. Kersten, “Classification objects, ideal observers and
generative models,” Cognitive Science, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 227–239, 2004.
[34] A. N. Sanborn, T. L. Griffiths, and R. M. Shiffrin, “Uncovering
mental representations with markov chain monte carlo.” Cogn
Psychol, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 63–106, Mar 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2009.07.001
[35] J. B. Freeman and N. Ambady, “Mousetracker: software for studying
real-time mental processing using a computer mouse-tracking method.”
Behav Res Methods, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 226–241, Feb 2010. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BRM.42.1.226
[36] D. Bates and M. Maechler, lme4: Linear mixed-eects models us-
ing s4 classes, 2009, [Computer software manual]. Available from
http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lme4.
[37] R. Baayen, D. Davidson, and M. Bates, “Mixed-effects modeling with
crossed random effects for subjects and items,” Journal of Memory and
Language, vol. 59, p. 390412, 2008.
[38] R. Dale, C. Kehoe, and M. J. Spivey, “Graded motor responses in the
time course of categorizing atypical exemplars.” Mem Cognit, vol. 35,
no. 1, pp. 15–28, Jan 2007.
[39] L. Barca and G. Pezzulo, “Unfolding visual lexical decision in time,”
PLoS ONE, vol. 7, no. 4, p. e35932, 2012.
[40] M. J. Spivey, R. Dale, G. Knoblich, and M. Grosjean, “Do curved
reaching movements emerge from competing perceptions? a reply
to van der wel et al. (2009).” J Exp Psychol Hum Percept
Perform, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 251–254, Feb 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0017170
[41] M. Spivey, M. Grosjean, and G. Knoblich, “Continuous attraction toward
phonological competitors,” Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the USA, vol. 102, pp. 10 393–10 398., 2005.
[42] R. P. R. D. van der Wel, J. R. Eder, A. D. Mitchel, M. M. Walsh,
and D. A. Rosenbaum, “Trajectories emerging from discrete versus
continuous processing models in phonological competitor tasks: a
commentary on spivey, grosjean, and knoblich (2005).” J Exp Psychol
Hum Percept Perform, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 588–594, Apr 2009. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.35.2.588
[43] P. D. Allopenna, J. S. Magnuson, and M. K. Tanenhaus, “Tracking the
time course of spoken word recognition using eye movements: Evidence
for continuous mapping models,” Journal of Memory and Language,
vol. 38, pp. 419–439, 1998.
[44] K. M. Eberhard, M. J. Spivey-Knowlton, J. C. Sedivy, and M. K. Tanen-
haus, “Eye movements as a window into real-time spoken language
comprehension in natural contexts.” J Psycholinguist Res, vol. 24, no. 6,
pp. 409–436, Nov 1995.
[45] L. Itti, C. Koch, and E. Niebur, “A model of saliency-based visual at-
tention for rapid scene analysis,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis
and Machine Intelligence, vol. 20, no. 11, pp. 1254–1259, Nov 1998.
[46] M. Mermillod, P. Bonin, L. Mondillon, D. Alleysson, and N. Vermeulen,
“Coarse scales are sufficient for efficient categorization of emotional fa-
cial expressions: Evidence from neural computation,” Neurocomputing,
no. 73, pp. 2522–2531, 2010.
[47] M. H. Bickhard, “Function, anticipation and representation,” in Comput-
ing Anticipatory Systems. CASYS 2000 - Fourth International Confer-
ence, D. M. Dubois, Ed. Melville, NY: American Institute of Physics,
2001, pp. 459–469.
[48] R. Grush, “The emulation theory of representation: motor control,
imagery, and perception.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 27, no. 3,
pp. 377–96, Jun 2004.
[49] G. Pezzulo, “Grounding procedural and declarative knowledge in sen-
sorimotor anticipation,” Mind and Language, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 78–114,
2011.
[50] J. O’Regan and A. Noe, “A sensorimotor account of vision and visual
consciousness.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 883–
917, 2001.
[51] G. L. Drescher, Made-Up Minds: A Constructivist Approach to Artificial
Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
[52] E. Rosch, C. Mervis, W. Gray, D. Johnson, and P. Boyes-Braem, “Basic
objects in natural categories,” Cognitive Psychology, vol. 8, p. 382439,
1976.
[53] P. Gardenfors, Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought. Cam-
bridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2000.
[54] D. L. Medin and M. M. Schaffer, “Context theory of classification
learning,” Psychological Review, vol. 85, p. 207238, 1978.
[55] R. A. Brooks, “A robust layered control system for a mobile robot,”
IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, vol. 2, pp. 14–23, 1986.
[56] J. Johnson, J. Spencer, and G. Schoner, “Moving to higher ground: The
dynamic field theory and the dynamics of visual cognition,” New Ideas
in Psychology, vol. 26, pp. 227–251, 2008.
[57] J.-C. Quinton, B. Girau, and M. Lefort, “Competition in high dimen-
sional spaces using a sparse approximation of neural fields,” in From
Brains to Systems: Brain Inspired Cognitive Systems 2010, ser. Advances
in Experimental Medicine and Biology, vol. 718. Springer-New York,
2011.
[58] M. Grosjean, J. Zwickel, and W. Prinz, “Acting while perceiving:
assimilation precedes contrast.” Psychol Res, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 3–13,
Jan 2009. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-008-
0146-6
[59] L. Barsalou, “Grounded cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology,
vol. 59, pp. 617–645, 2008.
[60] G. Pezzulo and G. Calvi, “Computational explorations of perceptual
symbol system theory,” New Ideas in Psychology, vol. 29, no. 3, pp.
275–297, 2011.
[61] F. G. Ashby, S. W. Ell, and E. M. Waldron, “Procedural learning in
perceptual categorization.” Mem Cognit, vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 1114–1125,
Oct 2003.
[62] J.-C. Quinton and J.-C. Buisson, “Multilevel anticipative interactions for
goal oriented behaviors,” in Proceedings of EpiRob’08 - International
Conference on Epigenetic Robotics (Brighton, UK). Lund University
Cognitive Studies, 2008, pp. 103–110.
[63] J.-C. Quinton and T. Inamura, “Human-robot interaction based learning
for task-independent dynamics prediction,” in Proceedings of EpiRob’07
- International Conference on Epigenetic Robotics (Piscataway, USA).
Lund University Cognitive Studies, 2007, pp. 133–140.
[64] G. Pezzulo and G. Calvi, “Designing modular architectures in the
framework akira,” Multiagent and Grid Systems, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 65–86,
2007.
[65] G. Pezzulo and D. Ognibene, “Proactive action preparation: Seeing ac-
tion preparation as a continuous and proactive process,” Motor Control,
2011.
[66] G. Pezzulo, L. Barsalou, A. Cangelosi, M. Fischer, K. McRae, and
M. Spivey, “The mechanics of embodiment: A dialogue on embodiment
and computational modeling,” Frontiers in Cognition, vol. 2, no. 5, pp.
1–21, 2011.
